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Enlisted attrition is usually defined as the failure to complete the 
contracted first enlistment term.  Such departures from the military 
may be voluntary or involuntary and may result from a variety of 
circumstances.  Regardless of the cause of attrition the services incur 
a cost when an individual leaves duty prematurely—the expenses 
involved in recruiting and training a replacement.  This study presents 
an analysis of attrition patterns in Army and Navy for the FY 2008 
accession cohort and the associated costs.   
In FY 2008 the average total cost of training a new recruit--from the 
time the individual walks into a recruiting station until he reaches his 
first duty station--was $ 75,000 in the Army and $80,000 in the Navy. 
These costs include both the fixed and variable costs of recruiting, 
processing at the Military Entry Processing Stations, boot camp 
training and follow-on individual skill training. The cost of attrition 
equals all the expenses of replacing an individual minus any 
investment recovery that may occur while performing productively on 
the job—i.e. the marginal (or variable) costs rather than the average 
costs.  Under the assumption that the Army and Navy can recover at 
least part of their investment in recruiting and training by keeping 
initial wages low, the cost of attrition varies over the term of first 
enlistment—at first rising and then declining after the soldier or 
seaman is assigned a job.  
 
Table 1 below displays the findings of this report.  Two estimates are 
presented: a lower bound without enlistment bonus costs and upper 
bound with enlistment bonus costs. The first estimate assumes that  
individuals who separated early--and received a bonus after training--
refund the money to the service. The second estimate assumes that 
the bonus monies are not recovered from individuals who do not 






Number	of Number	of	 Attrition Lower	bound Upper	bound	
Early Accessions Attrition Cost	per (no	Enlistment (with	Enlistment
Separations Rate Attrite Bonus	Costs) Bonus	Costs)
Army Boot	Camp 5,903					 9,669$			 57.1$												 57.1$														
Individual	Training 3,780					 19,125$	 72.3$												 72.3$														
Post-training 7,602					 46,050$	 295.3$										 350.1$												
Total 17,285			 80,014				 21.6% 27,738$	 424.7$										 479.4$												
Navy Boot	Camp 2,714					 11,070$	 30.0$												 30.0$														
Individual	Training 2,726					 22,700$	 61.9$												 61.9$														
Post-training 2,508					 50,900$	 116.7$										 127.7$												
Total 7,948					 38,461				 20.7% 27,627$	 208.6$										 219.6$												
Total	Army	and	Navy 25,233			 118,475		 21.3% 633.3$										 699.0$												
Source:		Army	and	Navy	records	and	authors	calculations
Two appendixes are also included.  Appendix A presents estimates of 
FY 2008 attrition costs resulting from individuals who sign contracts 
and enter the Delayed Entry Pool (DEP), but later drop out and thus, 
are not inducted into the military. The cost of this attrition is simply the 
marginal cost of recruiting individuals with specific education and 
ability characteristics.    
 
The Appendix B reviews the previous studies of attrition costs.  The 
most recent of these studies (GAO, 2011) uses data for an older 
population (FY 2004 to FY 2009) and variable costs to measure 
attrition costs.  When adjusted for population differences the reported 











Attrition can be expensive to the DOD, especially when personnel leave service 
before the end of their first enlistment. This is because the services make 
investments in recruiting and training that have usually not been recovered when 
an individual separates early.  A review of the current attrition patterns and the 
associated costs will help the Army and Navy make cost-effective decisions 
when selecting personnel.  In addition, knowledge of the cost of attrition can 
assist in determining the optimal enlistment contract and reenlistment rate.  The 
costs incurred when an individual leaves the service depend on the enlistment 
phase of separation. This study develops cost estimates using boot camp, 
advanced individual training and post-training (on-the-job) performance as the 
primary attrition phases.  
 
Plan of This Report 
 
The analysis in this report is based on data for the FY 2008 entry cohort supplied 
by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).  Beginning with entry into the 
Delayed Entry Program (DEP) individuals are tracked through the Military Entry 
Processing Station (MEPS), through boot camp and advanced individual training, 
and finally, to the end of their term of obligated service.  This procedure captures 
attrition numbers through a typical three-year contract in the Army and a typical 
four-year contract in the Navy.  
 
The cost of attrition (defined in the following section) is computed for each of the 
phases during which separation occurs, beginning with boot camp. (DEP attrition 
is addressed separately in Appendix A.)  Separation costs include all the variable 
costs associated with an early separation and, when multiplied by the number of 
separations and the average length of time spent in training or on-the-job, yields 
an estimate of the total cost of attrition.  Separate estimates are provided for 
each phase of attrition, as well as a total for the FY 2008 cohort. 
 
As explained below, the analysis includes only those separations that are judged 
to be pejorative in nature.  This procedure is admittedly somewhat arbitrary, 
involving some judgment on the part of the analyst.  Basically, a person who 
seeks to sever the enlistment contract can do so by displaying a pattern of 
disciplinary infractions tantamount to openly requesting a discharge.  It is 
obviously difficult to determine from administrative records whether attrition is 
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truly voluntary and involuntary in nature—the result of medical or physical 
unfitness as opposed to behavioral delinquency or the result of innocuous, 
unforeseen or random events.  In addition, enlistment bonuses received by 
persons separating early may or may not be recovered by the services; as a 
result, the estimates of the attrition costs presented in this report should be 
























The Cost of Attrition 
 
The cost of attrition equals all the expenses of replacing an individual minus any 
investment recoupment that may occur while performing productively on the job. 
Under the assumption that the Army and Navy can recover at least part of their 
investment in recruiting and training by keeping initial wages low, the cost of 
attrition varies over the term of first enlistment—at first rising and then declining 
after the soldier or seaman is assigned a job. 
 
Measuring the cost of attrition that occurs prior to completion of training period is 
relatively straightforward and involves adding up all the costs incurred to replace 
a departing individual.  When an individual leaves the delayed-entry program 
(DEP), the cost of attrition equals the cost of recruiting a replacement.  In 
contrast, when an individual leaves during the training period, the cost of attrition 
equals the cost or recruiting a replacement plus training that replacement to the 
level of training reached by the departing individual. In other words, the cost of 
training-period attrition is not only more expensive to the Army or Navy than 
DEP-attrition, but the cost also rises according to an individual’s level of training.   
 
Measuring the cost of attrition after completion of initial training is more complex 
than in other phases because one must account for an investment recovery that 
may occur.  Because the Army and Navy produce services that are not sold in a 
market it is difficult to place a value on the production on an individual soldier or 
seaman in an economically meaningful way.  Without knowing the value of an 
individual’s output it is very difficult to measure accurately degree of recoupment 
and thus the cost of post-training attrition.   As result, this analysis is required to 
make strong assumptions about the wage structure of the services to quantify the 
cost of post-training attrition.  
 
Defining the Attrition Measure 
 
Although attrition is sometimes defined as any separation before completion of 
one term of service, this criterion does not differentiate between the many 
different behaviors that may contribute to a person’s early departure.  Using 
separation cause data for the FY 2008 cohort the ISC codes were organized into 
eight broad categories: (1) release from Active Service, (2) medical 
disqualifications, (3) dependency or hardship, (4) death, (5) entry into Officer 
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programs, (6) retirement, (7) failure to meet minimum behavioral or performance 
criteria and (8) other.1  The first category is indicative of releases following a 
successful term and thus is the antithesis of attrition.  Losses due to death, entry 
into officer programs and retirement are relatively infrequent and not usually 
considered to be criteria for attrition.  Medical disqualifications and 
dependency/hardship cases are also relatively small in number but could be 
considered for attrition analysis.  However, first-term attrition in this paper is 
defined according to the remaining category—failure to meet minimum 
behavioral or performance criteria-- which, for the FY 2008 cohort covering 
service from FY 2008 through FY2011, included 25,233 individuals, or 60% of all 
early separations in the Army and Navy. 
 
Defining the Cost Measures 
 
The Army and Navy’s investment in enlisted personnel consists of both fixed and 
variable costs.  The fixed costs can be thought of as overhead or infrastructure 
costs that are not easily or quickly changed and cannot be associated with a 
single enlistee.  Examples of a fixed cost are the total number of recruiters or the 
advertising expenditures for a given year.  Variable costs are directly connected 
to each recruit such as MEPS examinations, transportation from the MEPS to 
basic training and pay and allowances for each enlistee.2   
 
This study assumes that recruiting expenditures are all fixed costs; that is, during 
a given recruiting period the resources devoted to the recruiting effort cannot be 
changed.  (This is not the same as assuming that recruiter effort per contract 
cannot be influenced in the short run).  For training expenditures the data 
suggest that approximately 50% of all spending is fixed and 50% is variable.3  
Finally, for post-training attrition, data is not available to calculate the rate of 



















personnel--who have just completed training--are just as productive as senior 
personnel in a job, but are paid at lower rates.  Therefore, the services receive 
some gains from an individual who leaves before completion of the first term.  
This assumption clearly overstates the amount of recovery that actually exists 




























The General Patterns of First-Term 
Attrition and Associated Costs  
 
 
Attrition from Boot Camp 
 
 
About one-third of first-term attrition occurs during boot camp.  In FY 2008 
approximately 5900 and 2715 of non-prior service accessions left the Army and 
Navy respectively, before the end of 12 weeks of training.  (These figures 
exclude another 2300 persons who were judged to have entered the service 
under fraudulent circumstances). Boot camp attrition rates vary across ability 
levels and education levels. Controlling for education the attrition rate is generally 
higher for low-ability groups.  
 
The cost the services incur when an individual leaves during boot camp equals 
the cost of recruiting and training a replacement.  The cost of recruiting a 
replacement is equal to the marginal cost of recruiting a person with the same 
education and ability as the person who separated.  Using the results from a 
Rand study for the Army (2008) the marginal cost of generating a high-quality 
enlistment (using additional recruiters) is about $ 5300 on the margin.4  Of 
course, the Army also benefits from an enhanced supply of lower-quality 
contracts as well, and these additional contracts cost only about $3300 on the 
margin.  Assuming a 50/50 split between high and low quality in the separations 
means that to generate a pool of replacements would cost, on average, $4300 
per recruit.    
 
 
The cost of training a replacement through boot camp is equal to all of the 
expenditures the service must make to train a replacement to the level of the 








train a recruit through boot camp in FY 2008 was approximately $16,100 and 
$20,300, respectively.  Assuming that trainees leave on average after 6 weeks 
(of a 9 week course) in the Army and 8 weeks (of a 12 week course) in the Navy 
and that variable costs are 50% of total costs, the marginal cost is $5370 and  




The expected total cost of boot camp attrition equals the number of boot camp 
attrites times the marginal cost of recruiting and training an individual who leaves.  
Table 2 shows the estimates of boot camp attrition costs for FY 2008. 
      
      
Table	2:		Boot	Camp	Attrition	Costs	for	Army	and	Navy:	FY	2008
Number	of Number	of Attrition Cost	per Total	Cost
Entrants Attrites Rate Attrite	 ($M	FY	2008)
Army	 80,014								 5903 7.4% 9,669$						 57.1$																	







Attrition from Initial Skill Training 
 
The length of initial skill training varies significantly across occupation fields; 
therefore measuring the aggregate attrition during this phase is difficult.  Initial 
skill training can last from 6 weeks to 2 years.  The average length of training is 
85 days in the Army and 75 days in the Navy.  Assuming that individuals who 
attrite stay for 50% of the training the attrition cost is computed as the sum of: (1) 
the marginal cost of recruiting a person of average education and ability ($4300); 
(2) the full marginal cost of boot camp training ($8,050 in the Army and $10,150 
in the Navy) and (3) the partial cost of individual training ($13,550 in the Army 




The total costs of individual training attrition are shown in Table 3. 
 
 
      
      Table	3:		Individual	Training	Attrition	Costs:	FY	2008
Entrants Attrites Attrition Cost	per	 Total	Cost
Rate Attrite
Army 74805 3780 5.1% 19,125$						 72,292,500$						








Attrition during the Remainder of the First-Term of Enlistment 
 
 
After the completion of initial skill training and assignment to a job the attrition 
rate averages about 5% per year in the Army and 3% per year in the Navy.   
 
Quantifying the cost of post-training attrition is difficult because it is not known 
when, in an individual’s enlistment, the Army or Navy recovers its investment in 
recruiting and training.  The services could recover some of its investment by 
paying new recruits less than more senior personnel to do the same job---i.e. the 
same quality and quantity of work.  If this is the case then, the Army and Navy 
may pay new personnel low wages because they are implicitly paying them by 
providing training (for example, building their stock of human capital).  
 
A simple example illustrates the concept of recovery of the investment in an 
individual.   Suppose an experienced soldier (grade E-4 or E-5) produces $100 
worth of output in a work period and is paid $100.  A newly trained recruit (grade 
E-2 or E-3) also can produce $100 worth of output in a work period but is paid 
only $50. In addition, suppose that it costs $100 to recruit and train an individual.  
If the new recruit quits after one work period the attrition has implicitly cost the 
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service $50.  Because in this example new recruits are paid less than senior 
personnel for the same work, the service is able to retain part of its investment (in 
this case $50) and the cost of post-training attrition is less than the cost of 
recruiting and training. 
 
Under the current wage structure the Army and Navy cannot recover their 
investments in less than one term.  For example, in FY 2008, the marginal cost of 
training a recruit the Army was $25,900 if the recruit attended Basic Training and 
Individual Training. 5  For a 3-year enlistment in the Army the post-training work 
period lasts two years. An E-4 with 3 years of experience cost $ 82,500 over the 
3 year work period.  In contrast, an E-1 cost $57,400.   The wage gap between 
senior first-term personnel and new recruits is about equal to the marginal cost of 
training and recruiting—in FY 2008 the wage difference was $25,100 --versus the 
$25,900 required to recruit and train a new soldier.  If the wage differential 
between an E-1 and E-4 is due strictly to investment recovery (i.e. E-1s and E-4s 
are equally productive) then Army can recoup its marginal investment in about 
one term under the present wage structure.   
 
Because it is difficult to measure the output of a soldier or seaman in an 
economically meaningful way, the degree of investment cannot be easily 
determined.  As a lower bound estimate of the cost of post-training attrition the 
Army is assumed to recoup its investment in one year.  This assumption clearly 
overstates the degree of investment recouping that actually occurs and thus 
results in an underestimation of the cost of post-training attrition.  
 
The services are assumed to recover their investments in first-term training 
evenly over the post-training period.  In addition, for each personnel category the 
attrition rate remains basically the same throughout the post-training period.  
Assuming that investment recovery occurs evenly, and given the even spread of 
post-training attrition over time, approximately one-half of the investment in 
recruiting and training is recouped when the typical individual leaves during the 
post-training period.  Thus, as a first-order estimate, the average cost of post–
training attrition equals approximately one-half the marginal cost of recruiting and 
training, or .5 x $25,900 = $12,950.  The corresponding cost for the Navy is .5 
times $30,950 = $15,475.   
 
The Effect of Enlistment Bonuses 
 
Enlistment bonuses may influence attrition through two channels.  First, 
enlistment bonuses affect the incentive for early departure, because in cases 
where bonuses exceed a threshold amount they are paid in installments over the 
first term of service.  Individuals who terminate their military service before the 
end of their term are ineligible to receive outstanding bonus payments.   Thus, 





fulfill their service obligation. Second, enlistment bonuses may also induce 
individuals with an otherwise lower-than-average taste for service to enlist.  If 
such individuals are more likely to attrit during their first term then this selection 
effect of bonuses would tend to generate a positive relationship between bonus 
receipt and first-term attrition. 
 
In FY 2008 the Army spent $422 M on enlistment bonuses while the Navy 
invested $192 M.  About 75% of all enlistees in the Army received some form of 
enlistment bonus averaging $18,000 in FY 2008.  In the Navy a smaller 
percentage of recruits received bonuses (about 40%) and the average bonus 
was $14,000 in FY 2008.   
 
When a member completes boot camp and individual skill training he is eligible to 
receive bonus payments.  The bonus is paid as a lump-sum for payments up to a 
threshold of $5000 and in installments for larger amounts.  For service members 
who separate before completion of their initial contracts the bonus money may or 
may not have been paid in full.  Although the government is required to recoup 
the bonus payments that an early separation member has received, evidence 
suggests that this is rarely accomplished.  Thus, there some additional cost--due 
to enlistment bonus payments--that is incurred when a member separates early.   
 
Since data on detailed enlistment bonus payments is hard to come by, this study 
makes some simplistic assumptions to estimate the additional cost.  It is 
assumed that 75 percent of Army and 40 percent of Navy post-training 
separations were awarded the average bonus and at the time of separation they 
had received one-half of the total bonus amount for which they were eligible.   
Table 4 presents estimates of the total post-training attrition costs with and 




Entrants Attrites Attrition Cost	per	 Upper	bound Cost	per Lower	Bound
Rate Attrite Total	Cost	$M Attrite Total	Cost	$M
Army 71025 7602 10.7% 46,050$	 350.1$								 38,850$	 295.3$								





        
        Total First Term Attrition Costs                           
 
Table 5 presents estimates for the total attrition costs: the sum of boot camp, 
individual training and post-training attrition costs. Two estimates are shown for 
FY 2008. The first estimate represents a lower bound and assumes that 
enlistment bonuses are fully recovered from individuals who separate early.  The 
second estimate represents an upper bound and assumes that none of the 




Number	of Number	of	 Attrition Lower	bound Upper	bound	
Early Accessions Attrition Cost	per (no	Enlistment (with	Enlistment
Separations Rate Attrite Bonus	Costs) Bonus	Costs)
Army Boot	Camp 5,903					 9,669$			 57.1$												 57.1$														
Individual	Training 3,780					 19,125$	 72.3$												 72.3$														
Post-training 7,602					 46,050$	 295.3$										 350.1$												
Total 17,285			 80,014				 21.6% 27,738$	 424.7$										 479.4$												
Navy Boot	Camp 2,714					 11,070$	 30.0$												 30.0$														
Individual	Training 2,726					 22,700$	 61.9$												 61.9$														
Post-training 2,508					 50,900$	 116.7$										 127.7$												
Total 7,948					 38,461				 20.7% 27,627$	 208.6$										 219.6$												















Summary and Conclusions 
 
The analysis and data presented above suggest that first-term attrition from the 
FY 2008 accession cohort cost the Army between $425 million and $480 million, 
depending on whether or not enlistment bonus costs are included. The 
corresponding costs for the Navy were between $209 million and $219 million.    
Whether these costs should be deemed excessive depends on the alternative 
strategies that could be employed and the associated costs. The role of recruiting 
in attrition seems to hold some promise. Can recruiters be trained to present 
more realistic views of military life?  Would such training be well received by the 
recruiting community? Recruiters might receive extra credit for enlistments that 
are successful in basic and individual skill training.  The costs and benefits of 
such approaches, along with recruiter contingencies for attrition, need to be 
considered.  
 
A better matching between individuals and jobs (or at least the ability to steer 
recruits away from particularly poor job choices) would assist in lowering attrition 
during the post-training phase of the first enlistment.  The Army and Navy are 
both working on evaluation tools to assist with occupational choices. Of course, 
even if these tools are successful attrition would not cease to exist, nor should it, 
since not all attrition is bad.    
 
The costs associated with first-term attrition will continue to draw the attention of 
outside groups (e.g. Congress).  The Army and Navy will be in a better position 
to answer these concerns if the causes they can control are understood.  In 
recent years the first-term attrition rates have been trending downward—perhaps 
because the youth job market in the civilian sector has deteriorated. If this 
situation continues it may result in less interest from the outside as the attrition 
problem may seem to have diminished.  But the services need to guard against 
complacency because it is unlikely a favorable recruiting environment will 











Appendix A:   
 
Attrition Costs from the Delayed 




Attrition from the DEP 
 
The Delayed Entry Program (DEP) is an important management tool used by the 
recruiting commands of the military services. This program allows individuals to 
delay reporting for active duty up to 12 months after signing an enlistment 
contract.  The flexibility provided by the DEP permits the services to smooth the 
flow of recruits into the training base despite seasonal fluctuations in recruiting.  
DEP functions in much the same way as sales inventories, permitting smooth 
production flows despite fluctuations in demand.  Recruiters are able to reduce 
costs by concentrating their enlistment efforts on those individuals most likely to 
join the military, even though induction may take place at a later date.  The DEP 
is also a countercyclical tool permitting the Army and Navy to increase the 
number of enlistees during favorable recruiting times and drawing it down during 
times when recruiting is more difficult by expanding and contracting the size of 
the DEP. 
 
On the other hand, managing the DEP can be costly.  Recruiters must keep track 
of enlistees, provide activities that maintain interest in military service and identify 
and solve problems that could lead to DEP loss.  Replacements for DEP losses 
must be found to fill otherwise empty training slots.  This all requires the 
expenditure of additional recruiting resources, especially recruiter time.   
 
The cost the services incur when an individual leaves the DEP is equal to the 
expense of recruiting a replacement.  The cost of DEP attrition is basically 
independent of the length of time the individual spends in the DEP because there 
are virtually no DEP carrying costs.  The cost of recruiting varies with the ability 
level of the recruit.  Recruiting HSGs and higher-level ability personnel is more 
difficult because those individuals have better opportunities in the job and 
education markets.  Thus, the cost of DEP attrition rises with the education and 
ability level of the individual. 
 
The supply of high-ability candidates who are interested is assumed to be limited.  
Over the relevant range the supply curve for high-ability personnel is initially 
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horizontal but after the supply of those individual is exhausted the supply curve 
turns upward.  Thus, recruiters must spend more time and effort to obtain added 
personnel and the amount of active recruiting needed rises with the demand for 
high ability.  The cost associated with recruiting an extra individual to replace a 
high-ability accession who leaves prematurely equals the marginal recruiting 
cost; thus the cost exceeds the average cost of initially recruiting the individual 
who leaves the DEP. 
 
The cost of recruiting low-ability personnel is not directly known.  The average 
cost of all recruits is used as proxy but this is clearly too high.  Only the support 
costs associated with running the recruiter network should be included—i.e. the 
average cost of 1-5 days to process a walk-in applicant.   
 
The marginal cost of recruiting high-ability personnel is taken from an enlistment 
supply equation developed at the Rand Corporation.  (Dertouzos, James N. and 
Steven Garber, June 2008, “Performance Evaluation and Army 
Recruiting”,W74V8H-00-C-0001, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica , CA.) 
 
In that study the authors present an enlistment supply equation which gives the 
relationship between the number of accessions and the amount of resources and 
numbers of recruiters.  They perform a variety of simulations assuming that 
missions increase along with the number of recruiters so that mission difficulty is 
held constant, despite the increased potential supply stimulated by the extra 
recruiters. Under the assumption that recruiters cost approximately $3000 per 
month, the addition of recruiters can generate high-ability enlistment contracts 
that cost about $5300 at the margin.   
 
The expected cost of DEP attrition equals the marginal cost of recruiting times 
the number of early separations in each personnel category.  Table A-1 shows 




Army DEP	losses Marginal Total	Cost	$M
Cost
Total 5145 21.09$			
CAT	I-II 2058 5,300$			 10.9$					
CAT	III-IV 3087 3,300$			 10.2$					
Navy
Total 6003 24.61$			
CAT	I-II 2401 5,300$			 12.7$					







      
  
       
      
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       









While there have been many past studies of the factors determining rates of 
attrition there have been relatively few analyses that measure the cost of attrition.   
 
1. In 1986 May and Hughes found that attrition in the Marine Corps in the 
early 1980’s cost the service between $3100 and $3700 per contract, 
depending of the characteristics of the recruit.  In general, higher ability 
level personnel (measured by AFQT scores) cost more to replace than 
lower ability level personnel. 
 
(May, Laurie J. and Jacquelyn Hughes, June 1986, “Estimating the Cost of 
Attrition of First-Term Enlistees in the Marine Corps, CRM 86-168, Center 
for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA.) 
 
2. A 1997 study of attrition cost was performed by the General Accountability 
Office for the Senate Subcommittee on Personnel of the Armed Services.  
Using data for 1996 (obtained from DMDC) the authors estimate that 
between $9,400 and $13,500 was spent to recruit and train an individual 
through boot camp, and an additional $6,100 to $16,300 was spent to train 
through the initial entry skill.  Thus, by the time an individual was sent to 
his first duty station between $15,500 and $29,300 had been spent to 
prepare the recruit.  These are average costs:  a more accurate measure 
of replacement cost is the marginal cost (or variable cost) or $4300, which 
the GAO obtained from the Navy for training through boot camp (but not 
for the recruiting effort itself).  Using this partial variable cost the authors 
estimated savings from a 10 % reduction in attrition to be $15.4 million in 
the Army and $12.7 million in the Navy (in $1996).    
 
(General Accountability Office, “DOD could save Millions by Better 




3. In 2000 Cymrot and Parcell estimated that a 10% reduction in the first 
term attrition rate of 10% would lead to a reduction in demand for Navy 
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recruits of 6,500 to 7,000 annually.  They calculated that the average cost 
per recruit in FY 1999 was $10,000 (including training through boot camp) 
so the minimum savings would be $65 million to $70 million in the long 
run.  They did not, however, attempt to measure the marginal cost of 
attrition.  Furthermore, the authors concluded that other savings would be 
a possibility, as the training pipeline would be reduced.  Additional fleet 
readiness could be obtained, as the average sailor in the fleet would have 
a greater level of experience. 
 
(Cymrot, Donald J. and Ann D. Parcell, July, 2002,  “Quantity and Quality 




4. A Rand Corporation study in 2010 (Hosek, et al) addresses the question 
of the enlistment bonus (EB) effects on Army attrition rates.  While the 
study is not intended to present estimates of the cost of attrition per se, 
the authors found that in FY 2008 the Army enlistment bonus program 
probably decreased the first-term attrition rate by 5%.   In that fiscal year 
the Army spent $440 million on enlistment bonuses and prevented 4000 
early separations (.05 times 80,000 accessions) across all phases of the 
first-term.  Therefore, the implied savings (or cost of attrition) was 
$110,000 per separation.   In other words, if the Army had not made the 
enlistment bonus investment its total cost of attrition, over the first-term, 
would have been $110,000 greater per early separation, than it actually 
was. 
 
The $440 million was, of course, designed to accomplish other objectives, 
e.g. channel recruits into hard-to-fill skills, as well as increase the number 
of high-ability personnel joining the Army.  The Rand analysis used an 
instrumental variable technique to estimate the effect of the enlistment 
bonuses on attrition rates holding this other factors constant. Thus, the 
imputed cost estimate of $110,000 per separation is substantially higher 
than found in this report using actual cost data.  
 
(Hosek, James and Beth Asch, Francisco Martorell, Paul Heaton, Curtis 
Simon and John Warner, June 2009, “Cash Incentives and Military 
Enlistment, Attrition and Reenlistment”, MG-950-OSD, Rand Corporation, 
Santa Monica, CA).   
 
5. Recently the GAO prepared a report for the DOD detailing the costs of 
separating early 3,664 active military service members under its 
homosexual conduct policy from 2004 to 2009.  The authors present a 
cost analysis yielding an estimate of $52,800 per separation to recruit and 
train a replacement.  (By comparison, the present study’s estimate for 
post-training attrition costs in the Army is $46,050 and the Navy is 
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$50,900).  The GAO also attempted to include only variable costs in their 
analysis.  
 
The population in the GAO study had somewhat more time in service than 
the first-term population analyzed in this study:  54% had over two years 
of service in the GAO study as opposed to just 40% in the present study.  
In addition, over 50% of the GAO population served in critical skills which 
are more expensive to train. Given these differences, the GAO cost 
estimate seems to be fairly consistent with the results of this study.   
 
(General Accountability Office, “Personnel and Cost Data Associated with 
Implementing DOD’s Homosexual Conduct Policy, GAO-11-170, Jan 20, 
2011, Washington DC) 
 
 
